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CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
THEORY: OBSERVATIONS ON METHODOLOGY
CHANTAL THOMAS*

IN

recent years, increasing interest has arisen as to the potential applications for Critical Race Theory ("CRT") in international legal critique.
This Essay raises the question in methodological form. I begin by identifying four "strands" of critical methodology that have been used in CRT:
"external," "internal," "legitimate-ideological" and "illegitimate-ideological." The "external" strand criticizes doctrine by exposing its production
or reinforcement of what might be termed, in admittedly generalizing
shorthand, the "status quo,"1 and contrasts this function of the doctrine
with the portrait of social justice and equity implied to result from the
doctrine. The "internal" strand criticizes doctrine by exposing its internal
inconsistencies, which tend to prove doctrinal origin not in "autonomous"
legal reasoning, but rather in one or another set of social-policy preferences. The third and fourth strands both seek to expose the ways in which
the "ideology" or consciousness of legal decision-makers legitimates the
status quo by mediating or disguising its internal and external flaws. The
third strand, however, targets the operation of what I will term "legitimate"
social ideology-most often "liberal legalism"; whereas the fourth strand
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to
Keith Aoki, Nathaniel Berman, Ruth Gordon and Duncan Kennedy for comments.
An early version of this Essay was presented at the 1997 Yale Law School Critical
Race Theory Conference, and was subsequently published as Causes of Inequality in
the International Economic Order: Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development
Theory, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999). This Essay incorporates and
builds on the earlier version. In that version, I discussed two categories of critique:
material and ideological. This framework has been previously deployed, for
example Henry A. Giroux, Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of
Learning (1988). Participants in the conference have also deployed the
framework-see Keith Aoki, Centeringthe Immigrant in the Inter/NationalImagination,
85 CAL. L. REv. 1395, 1395 (1997) (quoting Vera M. Kutzinski, Commentary:
American Literary History as Spatial Practice, 4 Am. LiTERARY HIsT. 555 (1992));
Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History ofJurisdiction),97 MicH. L. REv. 843, 914
(1999)-or a modified version of it, see Amy Chua, The Paradox of Free Market
Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. Irr'L L.J. 287, 287 (2000)
(naming "material, political and ideological" categories of critique). The present
analysis expands the binary classification into four categories: external, internal,
legitimate-ideological and illegitimate-ideological. Versions of the current analysis
were presented at the September 1999 CLS conference at Birkbeck College,
University of London, and the February 2000 Tulane Law School conference on
Race and International Law.
1. The term seems to be used in these critiques most often as a shorthand for
social structures that are systematically inegalitarian in that they produce and
maintain various existing social, economic and political privileges in a way that can
be descriptively and predictively linked to criteria such as race, gender and class.

(1195)
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demonstrates that the "status quo" is rationalized not only by legitimate
social ideology, such as liberalism, but by "illegitimate" social ideologies,
such as racism. 2 After a brief discussion of how each method has been
used in CRT, I examine the relationship of each method to postwar criticism of the impact of international law and policy on developing countries. I am describing the latter group of critical works as "postcolonial
development theory."3
Given such a potentially broad endeavor, some disclaimers are clearly
in order. First, the comparison relies on a limited sample of CRT works,
and therefore draws examples from limited sources and excludes some
kinds of methodology altogether. 4 The same can be said for the works
2. "External" critique is discussed infra notes 8-32 and accompanying text; "internal critique" is discussed infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text; "legitimateideological" critique is discussed infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text; and "illegitimate-ideological" critique is discussed infra notes 76-102 and accompanying
text.
3. The term "developing countries" can be defined in many ways, geographical and historical definitions included. The World Bank classifies countries by income, and places some European countries, such as Greece and the former
Eastern bloc, in the middle-income category, at the same time true that some
countries traditionally identified as "developing," such as Hong Kong and Singapore, fall in the high income category. See, e.g., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 15253 (1996). This Essay adopts the definition of "developing countries" used by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which comprises Africa, Asia
(excluding Japan), Latin America and the Middle East (excluding Israel). See
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 1998 Production Year Book.
Economic growth is of course an insufficient definition of development, and its
deficiencies have been widely discussed and debated. See generally DIANA HUNT,
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT:

AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING PARADIGMS

(1989) (discussing historical approach to development economics and various paradigms invoked in development economics field). Notwithstanding widespread
recognition of its insufficiency, economic growth remains the lodestar of development policy for both governments and international institutions.
4. To claim to apply a CRT methodology begs the question as to how, and
whether, such a methodology can be defined, given that CRT is known for its
lack-and perhaps rejection-of a unifying method. See WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

3-7 (MariJ.

Matsuda et al. eds., 1993) (discussing CRT generally and six elements that have
been identified as "defining").
Notwithstanding its diversity, the critical theory field contains identifiable
methodological approaches. One such approach is the exposure of "dominant"
narratives in law, and the articulation of "counter-narratives" or "stories from the
bottom." MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-32 (1987) (analyzing CLS movement and advancing approach of "looking to the bottom" to assist critical scholars in understanding law and elements of justice); see also Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories
and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 308-12 (1993)
(analyzing family law and reproductive rights from perspective informed by "neglected stories" arising out of slavery and its abolition); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of
the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We
Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1584-93 (1993) (discussing
"master narrative" of white supremacy in context of recent civil disorder in Los
Angeles). Richard Delgado's Rodrigo Chronicles constitute the most elaborate and
sustained effort in this narrative vein. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss5/12

2

Thomas: Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observa
2000]

CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY

1197

5
examined here under the rubric of postcolonial development theory.
Moreover, the comparison, because it begins by looking at CRT, superimposes this lens on postcolonial development theory. The impetus for this
comparison was an inquiry into how CRT might be extended to international issues. Accordingly, the comparison begins by examining some
CRT and is thereafter shaped by that departure point. Finally, the identified categories do not attempt to describe the "essence" of any of these
6
theories, but serve strictly heuristic ends.

Acknowledging the stylized nature of this comparison, the methodological parallels and incongruities it highlights are still instructive. Both
of these critical theories focus on a sub-collectivity (racial minorities in the
United States and developing countries in the international community),
whose status within the constitutive legal system (U.S. law, international
law) has shifted from formally separate and subordinate to formally equal.
In their own ways, CRT and postcolonial development theory have sought
to expose and theorize this transition as insufficient and/or incomplete
and, therefore, unjust.
This commonality of purpose is reflected in other shared qualities. In
particular, it is interesting to note that both CRT and postcolonial development theory have been cautious with respect to the claim of indeterminacy that has been so salient in twentieth century American legal critique.
Many Critical Race theorists have expressed ambivalence about the indeChronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183, 1193-98 (1993)
(presenting Rodrigo's views on why law and economics do not account for continuation of racism and discussing recent conservative writing on American race
problem); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387, 403-08 (1993) (dialoguing Rodrigo's
view on what hinders national civil rights policy); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth
Chronicle:Neutrality and Stasis in AntidiscriminationLaw, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 113947 (1993) (discussing how neutral principles of constitutional law disadvantage
outsider groups). While this Essay does not focus on it, the narrative method has
been a defining feature of CRT, and is discussed elsewhere in this group of
commentaries.
CRT developed its methods in the context of a fairly specific time and placethe American legal academy of the 1970s and 1980s. For an explanation of this
development, see KIMBERLt WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, CRITICAL RACE THEORY THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT at xvi-xxxii (1995) [hereinafter KEY WRITINGS]; RiCHARD DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTTING EDGE at xiii-xvi

(1995) [hereinafter CUTTING EDGE].
5. As suggested by the opening paragraph, the term postcolonial development theory is not one adopted by the writers discussed below themselves, but
rather is applied to their works for descriptive ease because all their works share,
whatever their differences, a focus on the impact of international law on developing countries. Consequently, the discussion incorporates works from theorists of
political economy, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, as well as legal
theorists, including the earlier works of Mohamed Bedjaoui and contemporary
works. For a review of these works see infra notes 15-32, 49-57, 73-75 and 84-101
and accompanying text.
6. For a thorough account of critical methodology, see generally DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE (1997).
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terminacy argument. 7 And while postcolonial development theorists argued that international law was internally inconsistent, they stopped short
of charging the international legal system with inherent indeterminacy.
This absence in one theory and ambivalence in the other suggest a pervasive tension within critical theories whose specific goal is to expose the
insufficient integration of historically subordinatepopulations into the dominant legal system. To wit, such theories may be inherently conflicted in
their objective of exposing a system as structurally flawed, while advocating
its more perfect application-more effective rights for racial minorities,
more effective sovereignty for developing countries.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the methodological differences between the theories suggest ways for each to incorporate technique from
the other. CRT might benefit by strengthening its deployment of external
critique: that is, by more precisely articulating and theorizing the material
impact of current law on racial minorities. Postcolonial development theory, on the other hand, might benefit by incorporating post-structuralist
and post-modernist methods, which, though deployed elsewhere in
postcolonial theory, have only begun to be applied to postcolonial critiques of international law.
I.

THE "EXTERNAL" STRAND

External critique seeks to show that law perpetuates inegalitarian social conditions despite its claimed allegiance to social equality.8 In American legal criticism, external criticism has been deployed in a variety of
sources, beginning with the early twentieth century work of Louis Brandeis,9 Roscoe Pound" and Robert Hale.1" The contribution of CRT to
this tradition of criticism has been to focus specifically on how law affected
race relations. Thus, whereas conventional external criticism sought to
demonstrate that law claimed to promote general social equality, but in
fact perpetuated social inequality, CRT sought to show that liberal legal7. For further information, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
8. External critique need not serve left-leaning political ends. For example,
law and economics theorists seek to identify the efficiency, or costliness (leaving
open here how such questions might be defined), of legal rules. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Philippa Strum & Louis D. Brandeis, The New Freedom and the State,

69

MiW-AMERICA

105 (1987).

10. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909)
(arguing that concept of equal rights of employer and employee to liberty of contract "is utterly hollow. All the ado made over the system of contract is surcharged
with fallacy .... Why, then, do courts persist in this fallacy? Why do so many of
them force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical
conditions of inequality?" (internal citation omitted)).
11. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923) ("A careful scrutiny will ... demonstrate that
the systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restriction of individuals.., out of conformity with any formula
of 'equal opportunity' or of 'preserving the equal rights of others.'").
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ism claimed to promote racial equality but in fact perpetuated racial
inequality.
The most common focus for this critique has been the so-called color-

blind approach to constitutional interpretation, particularly to the equal
protection clause. 12 Critical Race theorists have argued that the colorblindness principle adheres to classically liberal notions of formal neutrality and equality that entrench, rather than correct, racial subordination;
hence Derrick Bell's argument for adopting a "Racial Realism" that "abandon[s]" the "ideal" of "racial equality" in the face of "the reality.., that
blacks still suffer disproportionately higher rates of poverty, joblessness
and insufficient health care, than other ethnic populations in the United
States." 13 Neil Gotanda has sounded the charge that "color-blind constitutionalism ...fosters white racial domination" by "maintain fing] the social,
economic and political advantages that whites hold over other
14
Americans."
In postcolonial development theory. The external postcolonial development critique of the international order asserts that it, though informed

by seemingly egalitarian liberal ideals, perpetuated the "underdevelopment"-that is, the entrenched economic inequality relative to the
North-of Southern countries, by failing to correct economic disadvantages bequeathed to the South by colonialism. Writers such as Andre Gun-

12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . .deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
13. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 378 (1992); id. at
364 (arguing for "viewing the law-and, by extension, the courts-as instruments for
preserving the status quo and only periodically and unpredictably serving as a refuge of oppressed people").
It is worth noting that the proposition that a racial focus was unique in legal
critique to CRT is disputed by some members of the CLS school, who point out
that CLS writers addressed racial inequality as one part of a network of critiques.
Examples of such critiques include Karl E. Klare, The Quest for IndustrialDemocracy
and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectivesfrom Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61
OR. L. REv. 157 (1982); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine,62 MiNN.
L. REv. 1049 (1978); and Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in ConstitutionalLaw:
The Equal ProtectionClause, Dr.Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74J. Am.HIsT.
884 (1987). For a fuller discussion, see Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (1987), and Responses to Minority
Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (1988).
14. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1, 2 (1991) (setting forth treatment of race consciousness of United States Supreme Court).
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der Frank,1 5 Rafl Prebisch 1 6 and Samir Amin, 17 working in the
"structuralist," "dependency" or "neo-Marxist" vein, mobilized this
critique.' 8
According to this external analysis, colonizing states in the North
transformed Southern economies into satellites of the Northern economies. 19 This colonialist organization of North-South relations displaced
previous patterns of production in the South and enabled Northern actors
to accumulate capital through the provision by Southern economies of
raw materials 20 and markets. 2 1 This provision led to a large-scale transfer
of resources from the South to the North. The colonial international
economy not only failed to develop the South, but actually "underdeveloped" the region by extracting indigenous resources and transforming it
from a self-reliant (albeit subsistence) economy to one dependent on both
15. See generally ANDRE

GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN

(2d ed. 1971) (mobilizing external postcolonial development critique) [hereinafter FRANK, CAPITALISM]; ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, THE DEVELOPMENT
LATIN AMERICA

OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

(1966) [hereinafter

FRANK, UNDERDEVELOPMENT].

16. See generally RAIYL PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA'S
GREAT TASK (1970) (noting structural differences); RAOL PREBISCH, TOWARDS A
NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT (1964) [hereinafter NEW TRADE POLICY]
(same).

17. See generally SAMIR

AMIN, LA NATION ARABE:

NATIONALISME ET LUTrES DE

CLASSES (1976); ACCUMULATION A L'ECHELLE MONDIALE (1974) (critiquing international order).

18. Other writers include: G. ARRIGHI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY IN RHODESIA
(1970); P. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957); Aidan FosterCarter, Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment, in

SOCIOLOGY

AND DEVELOPMENT (Emmanuel De Kadt & Gavin Williams eds., 1974); George

Lichtheim, Oriental Despotism, in GEORGE LICHTHEIM, THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
(1967); AFRICAN SOCIALISM (William H. Friedland & Carl G. Rosberg eds., 1964);
JULIUS NYERERE, UJAMAA: ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM (1968); Josp VILLAMIL, TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:

STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF DE-

(1978).
As in critical theory promulgated by Western writers on behalf of disadvantaged populations within Western society, the external postcolonial development
critique had both radical and reformist proponents. Writers like Frank and Amin
argued that Southern underdevelopment could be corrected only through "delinking," or exit by Southern countries from international economic relations with
PENDENCE

the North.

See generally

FRANK, CAPITALISM,

supra note 15 (arguing that un-

derdevelopment could be corrected through "delinking"). Prebisch, on the other
hand, argued that North-South international economic relations could be reformed, not least through the reform of international economic law. See NEW
TRADE POLICY, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing method for reform of North-South
international economic relations). Although the proposed solutions differed, the
analyses of the problem deployed a fairly similar external critical analysis.
19. That is, Southern economies were transformed from largely subsistence
production and regional trade patterns to "dual economies," wherein a significant
part of this activity became replaced by the production and extraction-directed
by Northern colonial actors-of raw materials for export to the Northern center.
20. This includes profits deriving from the low-cost, relatively high-return export of commodities to the North.
21. This includes profits deriving from the import of goods to the South, now
needed as a result of the displacement of indigenous production.
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imports from, and exports to, Northern markets. Political independence,
postcolonial critics pointed out, did little to alter this organization and,
therefore, perpetuated economic relations characterized by the "neocolonial" dominance of Northern economic actors both within the economies of developing countries ("DCs") and in the "international
22
market."
For postcolonial development theorists, the targets of critique were
often the international legal systems regulating international economic relations. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), for example, received several intensive applications of the structuralist or
dependency critique. 23 Critics showed that the system's organizing principle of "free trade" deprived DC governments from favoring domestic producers over foreign producers and from refusing to grant DC producers
preferential treatment in foreign markets. It also hindered industrialization in developing countries by preventing DC producers from breaking
into industrial sectors, consigning them to the production of raw materials
and dependency on imports that had been established as a result of
24
colonialism.
There are also parallels between the critique by Critical Race theorists
of American judicial interpretation of the principle of equal protection
and the criticisms that postcolonial theorists launched against the industrialized-country government interpretation of the international legal principle of sovereign equality. Postcolonial writers expressed agreement with
their opponents that sovereign equality was the fundamental principle
structuring international law; however, they objected to the view put forth
by industrialized-country governments and some Western theorists that
sovereign equality was to be understood as requiring no more than basic
recognition of every country as formally sovereign. Critics like Raal
Prebisch argued that this formal concept assumed "an abstract notion of
economic homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial centres and peripheral countries with all their important
25
implications."
Despite the profound differences in subject matter, Critical Race theorists and postcolonial development theorists employed a similar method:
to show how a population once formally excluded from a putatively universal and liberal legal system and relegated to a formally separate and
subordinate system-non-whites in U.S. law, and the Third World in inter22. This dominance is evidenced by disproportionately high import-dependence of developing countries, disproportionately low shares of world trade held
by developing countries and disproportionately high ratios of foreign direct investment to gross national product in developing countries.
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].

24. See, e.g., NEW TRADE
GATT).
25. NEW TRADE POLICY,

POLICY,

supra note 16, at 6 (discussing and criticizing

supra note

16, at 6.
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national law-had been ill-served by a subsequent formal inclusion that
ignored deep-rooted structural inequities. Notwithstanding this similarity,
this Essay's comparative analysis suggests that there may be room for CRT
to take a page from postcolonial development theorists by expanding on
the external dimension of critique. The CRT tracts cited above as external
criticism, for example, posit racial inequality without articulating the specific dynamics of it.
Such a suggestion demands some qualification. First, political scientists and economists, rather than lawyers, shaped the materialist explanations of postcolonial development theory. Second, many Critical Race
tracts have employed empirical analysis to document assertions of material
racial inequality. 26 Critical Race theorists have also employed social science for related ends, such as to explain the subjective basis 27 and subjective impact 2 8 of racism.
Third, non-empiricism is by no means exclusive to CRT, but rather
characterizes American legal scholarship in general. 29 There are some
good reasons for this: legal theorists enjoy a comparative advantage in textual, as opposed to empirical, analysis, so that empirical analysis can be
argued to fall outside a legal theorist's bailiwick. Moreover, attempting to
do empirical analysis without formal training may be foolhardy. Legal
realists, for example, became famously frustrated with their efforts at empirical substantiation. 30 Finally, it may be justifiable to assume that racial
inequality is patent and does not need substantiation. Notwithstanding all
these justified reservations, there may be value in exposing the precise
26. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Centiuy "Alien
Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REv. 37 (1998) (describing the
material effect of alien land laws); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the
White Juiy, 83 MICH. L. Rv. 1611 (1983) (referring to empirical studies to substantiate proposition that significant disparities exist in conviction rates for black and
white defendants); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-RacialIdenticationErrors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (discussing psychological data of cross-racial
identification); Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991) (describing
historical basis for the "devaluation of black motherhood").
27. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (explaining subjective basis of racism and discussing doctrine of discriminatory purpose).
28. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REv. 133 (1982) (discussing psychological harms of racism).
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Well-being and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1303, 1305
(1994) ("The failure to identify the empirical dimensions of legal disputes is a
continuing weakness in the legal culture.").
30. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 232-36 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,

1993) (describing commitment of early legal realists to empirical substantiation
and frustration of efforts to obtain it). "Some scholars labored mightily at empirical research, only to find conclusions elusive, their hard-won data so incomplete as
to be unpublishable, their work useless for suggesting reform." Id. at 236.
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material dynamics of legal structures, 31 if not through original empirical
32
work, then by incorporating work from the social sciences.
II.

THE "INTERNAL" STRAND

Internal critique emerged from American legal realism. 33 The critique charges that law is incoherent; despite prevailing representations of
the law as rational and consistent by both legal decision-makers and legal
academics, assessment of the law as applied in individual cases compels
the conclusion that it is neither.34 The charge of incoherence stems in
significant part from doctrinal analysis. With respect to legal doctrine understood as a compendium of organizing principles, the incoherence critique has demonstrated that a single principle (for example, "rights,"
31. Elsewhere I have tried to move in this direction by quantifying the broad
characteristics of the structural inequality that debilitates inner-city communities,
the structural dynamics that perpetuate that inequality and the role law and policy
play in creating that inequality. See generally Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1451 (2000).
32. Notable such works include DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

(1994);

SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE NEW MOBILITY
OF PEOPLE AND MONEY (1999); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY. NEW YORK,
LONDON, TOKYO (1993); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WoRK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
ADVANTAGED: THE INNER CrIY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990).

DIS-

33. The legal realist critique has integrally influenced contemporary legal decision-making and scholarship. SeeJoseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 465, 467 (1988) ("We are all legal realists now."). As an example of the pervasive absorption of the lesson of indeterminacy, see Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting
ConstitutionalVisions: Of Real and UnrealDifferences, 22 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 96
(1987):
Apart from the possible suggestion that the large principles at issue have
a readily discernible, unique and non-debatable 'objective meaning'-a
suggestion that nobody seriously maintains when pressed-there is little
at this level of generality to divide [Robert] Bork and [Edward] Meese
from more liberal lawyers, whether sitting judges or academics.
At the same time, the germ of the critique remained potent enough that critical
legal theorists could deploy it in the late twentieth century to considerable effect.
Thus, an earlier version of Singer's sound byte captured the "peculiarly ambivalent
status in traditional scholarship: 'Realism is dead; we are all realists now.'" Note,
'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1669 n.4 (1982) (quoting W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 382 (1973)). For a discussion of legal realism as the basis
for "incoherence" critique, see KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 82-96.

34. Hence the argument is that legal analysis be redirected from an attempt
to discern organizing "precepts" or "principles" to what "the courts will do in fact."
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 991, 992-94 (1897) (stating famed "bad-man" theory of law). Within U.S. legal scholarship, this project is
generally identified as having gestated in the late nineteenth century and reached
maturation with the ascent and self-identification of the legal realists in the 1920s
and 1930s. See id.; see also Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809-21, 838-42 (1935) (noting that reasonable
minds could disagree on interpretations of law); Karl N. Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 442-43 (1930).
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"freedom of contract" or the public/private distinction) 35 can be made to
support contrary outcomes even in the same case (the "incoherent principle" critique), and that contrary principles can apply equally to a single
case (the "incoherent facts" critique). 36 Internal methods of criticism
have also averred that incoherence in the law results not only from doctrinal weaknesses, but also from institutional weaknesses (again, primarily of
the judiciary) that allow variance across individual applications of the law
(the "incoherent institution" critique). 37 These dynamics result in doctrine that represents itself as capable of being explained and predicted
according to rational and consistent rules and categories, but that as ap38
plied cannot be so explained or predicted.
Of the three styles of incoherence critique, Critical Race theorists
have perhaps most vigorously exercised the first, seeking to expose the
35. For a collection of legal realist writings, and theoretical antecedents
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 30.
36. Because precedents involve both legal principles and facts, this method of
critique illustrates that the facts of any given case can be plausibly argued as either
within or outside of precedent. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 73-76
(Oceana ed., 1960); see also Singer, supra note 33 at 470 (noting that "any case can
be read in at least two ways"). Singer quotes Andrew Altman's statement that:
Depending on how ajudge would read the holdings in the cases deemed
to be precedents, she would extract different rules of law capable of generating conflicting outcomes in the cases before her. In the common-law
system, it was left undetermined as to which rules, of a number of incompatible rules, were to govern a case.
Singer, supra note 33, at 470 n.10 (quoting Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical
Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 208-09 (1986)).
37. The realist "credo is often caricatured as the proposition that how ajudge
decides a case on a given day depends primarily on what he or she had for breakfast." AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 30, at xiv. The caricature attempts to
ridicule the attention paid by legal realists to potential sociological and psychological influences on judicial behavior. See id.; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 145 (1930) (appealing for recognition of "need to see that biases
and prejudices and conditions of attention affect the judge's reasoning as they do
the reasoning of ordinary men"); Joseph C. Hutcheson,Jr., The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the "Hunch" in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278-79 (1929)
(admitting that, as judge, the "decision ...itself, as opposed to the apologia for
that decision" results from process of "feeling or 'hunching' out"); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 518, 522 (1986) (describing judge's reasoning process as "both free and

thereto, on these subjects, see generally

bound-free to deploy work in any direction but limited to the pseudo-objectivity
of the rule-as-applied, which he [or she] may or may not be able to overcome");
Max Radin, The Theory of JudicialDecision: Or, How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357,
359 (1925) (arguing that since "several categories struggle in the [ ] minds [of
judges] for the privilege of framing the situation before them, how can Uudges]
do otherwise than select the one that seems to lead them to a desirable result").
The primacy of this aspect of the "indeterminacy" argument is disputed. See
Singer, supra note 33, at 470 (criticizing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927-1960 (1986), for taking exaggerated view of this aspect of legal realist
critique).
38. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARv. L. REv.
1222, 1247-56 (1931). For a later discussion of this concept, see generally Duncan
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209 (1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss5/12

10

Thomas: Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observa

2000]

CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY

1205

application by courts of analytically indeterminate legal principles in a way
that perpetuates racial hierarchy. Lani Guinier has, for example, objected
to the interpretation of the "one-person, one-vote" principle in voting
39
rights jurisprudence to support winner-take-all territorial districting.
Terry Smith has shown that the United States Supreme Court has inconsistently pursued the principle of two-party stability to the detriment of Afri40
can-American franchise.
With respect to the Equal Protection Clause, Linda Greene has criticized the dominant "formal" conception of equal protection, as opposed
to a conception that is more historically, contextually and, therefore, racially conscious. 41 Similarly, Kimberl Crenshaw has remarked:
Only in ... a [racially equitable] society, where all other societal
functions operate in a nondiscriminatory way, would equality of
process constitute equality of opportunity.
This belief in color-blindness and equal process, however,
would make no sense at all in a society in which identifiable
groups had actually been treated differently historically and in
which the effects of this difference in treatment continued into
42
the present.
Critical Race theorists have also employed the incoherent facts critique,
showing how different rules can apply to the same facts, and that the dominant choice of rules has had racially subordinating results. Regina Austin
has shown that racially hostile remarks in the workplace, dismissed by
courts as damnum absque injuria,meet the criteria for relief on grounds of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 43 Richard Ford has shown that
courts have chosen between potentially applicable rules of property law in
44
a way that perpetuates geographical racial segregation.

39. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1589, 1595-98 (1993).
40. See generally Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the
Endangered Two-Party Paradigm,48 DuKE L.J. 1 (1998). Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525
(2000), demands recognition here as a rich and likely subject for future critics.
41. See Linda Greene, Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?,
reprinted in KEY WRITINGS supra note 4, at 292 (criticizing United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence for "us[ing] language that preserves the appearance of
proper concern for achieving equality-yet... the reasoning seems indifferent to
reality and to the impact of the decisions on the historical victims of racial
discrimination").
42. KimberlI Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimization in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1345 (1988).
43. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of EmotionalDistress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58 (1988) (concluding that it
is "extremely difficult to accept the assumption that employer abuse [including
racial remarks] and the emotional pain it causes workers are too subjective,
ephemeral, trivial, and mundane to warrant judicial relief").
44. See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: PoliticalGeography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841, 1860-78 (1994) (discussing various court decisions).
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Although the recognition of incoherence operates as an effective critique, many Critical Race theorists have observed its limitations. In The
Alchemy of Race and Rights, Patricia Williams recorded her deep ambivalence about dismissing the socially transformative potential of civil rights
on grounds of indeterminacy. 45 In Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in AntidiscriminationLaw, Kimber( Crenshaw confronts the question of what proponents for racial equity should do in
cognizance of the indeterminacy of antidiscrimination law.46 As Mari Matsuda has observed:
How could anyone believe both of the following statements? (1)
I have a right to participate equally in society with any other person; (2) Rights are whatever people in power say they are. One
of the primary lessons ... [to] learn from the experience of the
bottom is that one can believe in both of those statements simul7
taneously, and that it may well be necessary to do SO.4
The problem that Crenshaw, Matsuda and Williams confront stems from a
felt recognition of the urgency of immediate improvement in the social
conditions that generated and drives the Civil Rights Movement. 48 This
problem is strikingly similar to the felt recognition by many postcolonial
development theorists of the need for immediate improvement in the conditions of developing countries, which led to a parallel infusion of energy
into immediate reform of international economic law-in particular, the
New International Economic Order.

In postcolonial development theory.4 9 With respect to the incoherent
principle critique, postcolonial development writers sought to demon45. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991) (noting ambivalence about dismissing the socially transformative potential
of civil rights on grounds of indeterminacy); PATRCIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLORBLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE (1998) (same).
46. See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1331.

47. Matsuda, supra note 4, at 340.
48. Some Critical Race theorists have argued, however, that fundamental
transformation of race relations is impossible. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (noting possible
transformation).
49. This Essay looks specifically on writers whose focus was the impact of international economic law on postcolonial development. It is worth observing,
however, that important critical work has been done on international law more
generally, such as DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987);
MARTTI

KOSKENNIEMI,

FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-

(1989). Both of these works incorporate an "internal"
critique, striving to show how tropes in international legal discourse are indeterminate; as with much contemporary critique of American law, this is combined with a
structuralist project of discovering the discursive structure, which, it is then argued, mediates this indeterminacy.
It is interesting to note the similarities and differences between this work and
those discussed in this Essay. For example, while Kennedy's International Legal
TIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT

Structures rigorously employs the internal critique and demonstrates its placement
in a discursive structure, it is different from the legitimate-ideological critique be-
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strate how certain principles that industrialized-country governments had
invoked as justification for the international economic status quo could
also be invoked to justify reforms proposed by DC governments.
One such site of contestation was the principle of sovereign equality,
which is a fundamental organizing principle of international law.5 0 Much
as Critical Race theorists objected to a narrow, formalist view of the right
to equal protection and other civil rights, postcolonial development theorists criticized the prevailing narrow and formalist view of the principle of
sovereign equality. According to the formalist view, the principle of sovereign equality is only thinly constitutive, with no necessary bearing on economic and political relationships between states. 5 1 Mohamed Bedjaoui, a
prominent postcolonial legal scholar, articulated one of the better-known
versions of the critique of this rule:
Only the form of a legal concept is considered, while its content-the social reality it is supposed to express-is lost sight of.
In this view of an international law detached from reality, concepts are not just abstractions but mere artifices and fictions. As
a result, no attention at all is paid to the economic and political
context, which differs from one State to another according to
their degree of development and which governs the application of a
concept such as State sovereignty. Yet it is this context which is decisive in

cause it does not explicitly relate that structure to a prevailing social ideology, nor
does it explicitly incorporate an external critique. The absence of these elements
may be explained by the absence of a Marxian influence; or may be explained by
the more evident pre-modern discursive roots of international law or by the relative difficulty of portraying international law at least in its relationship to Northern
states as a source of coercion or hegemony either on the governments of these
states or on their populations. Of course, with the "internationalization" of all
manner of law that has historically been "domestic" in Northern states, this may be
changing, which accordingly begins to create a basis on which to deploy an external critique. See David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1
(1994) [hereinafter Kennedy, Receiving the International]. Koskenniemmi does incorporate a discussion of the relationship between the structuralism exposed and
an overarching liberal politics, but also does not forcefully incorporate an external
critique. See KOSKENIEMMI, supra, at 498-501. Koskenniemmi argues that international law can become more socially useful, but this is different from arguing that
it is currently socially coercive. See id.
50. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization [of the United Nations] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").

51. SeeJ.L.

BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS

130-33 (1963) (criticizing call for

"equal voice" and "equal representation" by "small states" in international affairs as
based on misleading and spurious interpretations of principle); Norbert Horn,
Normative Problems of a New InternationalEconomic Order, 16J. WORLD TRADE L. 338,
343 (1982) (deeming calls for reform of international economic order based on a
substantive interpretation of sovereign equality "confusion of legal and economic
concepts," and questioning compatibility of such reform with "the principle of sovereign equality of all nations").
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giving a concrete meaning to sovereignty-or in denying it any such
52
meaning.
Interpretive clashes arose over the question of what a government was entided to do under international law by virtue of sovereignty-the nature of
government authority and autonomy to execute its own decisions. Foreign investment law formed one such site of dispute over the meaning of
sovereignty. For example, industrialized-country governments argued that
sovereignty did not allow a government to void unilaterally contracts between itself and private persons (like multinational corporations with
long-term contracts in its territory), even if the government was doing so
in furtherance of some domestic policy (such as economic development
or, more specifically, nationalization). The line of reasoning was that, by
committing to the contract in the first place, a government by virtue of its
sovereignty bound itself irrevocably. Postcolonial theorists demonstrated
that sovereignty could just as easily be interpreted to support a rule that
would allow governments to retain a permanent capacity to void its com53
mercial contracts.
Postcolonial theorists also took issue with the principle of free trade
that was said to underlie GATT. In particular, postcolonial theorists
weighed in on the debate over whether industrialized-country governments should give non-reciprocal trade concessions to developing countries in recognition of their structurally weaker economic position and in
order to facilitate their development. While commentators opposing nonreciprocal preferences argued that those principles controverted free
trade, postcolonial critics demonstrated that free trade could support nonreciprocal preferences because trade would be less restricted in a world
where DC imports were not restricted from entering Northern markets
54
(even where Northern imports were restricted from DC markets).
With respect to the incoherent facts critique, it should be noted that
this type of analysis is most specific to the adjudication process and least
characteristic of other types of rulemaking, such as legislation. Because
there remains relatively little in the way of adjudication by international
bodies of international law, particularly international economic law, 55 and
most of the rules were legislative in character (that is, established as the
result of international agreement), this type of critique has not arisen with
respect to the GATI or the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). This
52. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
(1979) (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, The Climate of InternationalArbitration, 8 J. INT'L
AlB. 48 (1991).
54. See Kennedy, supra note 37, at 521 (discussing GATT and free trade).
55. Of course, I am referring to law directly affecting governments, so I am
excluding international arbitration between private parties, which is quite
common.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss5/12

14

Thomas: Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observa

2000]

CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY

1209

type of critique, however, has been used in a series of arbitration cases
56
surrounding nationalization in the 1970s.
With respect to the incoherent institution critique, both the GAT-T
and the IMF have been criticized by postcolonial theorists for their inconsistency. While DCs faced continuing resistance to the establishment of

non-reciprocal trade preferences in "exception" to the GATT rules, industrialized countries maintained long-term unilateral practices that directly
contravened GATT policy, including agricultural textiles policy in the
United States and European Union. The IMF, however, was criticized for
not disciplining industrial countries who broke from the fixed exchange
rate in contravention of IMF rules in the early 1970s.
It is striking to note that these internal critiques, though fiercely argued, generally did not go so far as to argue that the international legal
order was inherently indeterminate. Rather, they were used as part of a
full-scale movement to reform the international legal system. For example, although Bedjaoui criticized dominant views of law on grounds of an
irrational attachment to the legal status quo, he nonetheless expressed
faith in the determinacy of law, albeit determinate according to a functional rather than formal framework. The mistake of proponents of the
status quo was in conceptualizing law as "centered on itself, whereas it is in
fact a science embedded in reality and performing [an] eminently social

function

.... "57

The critiques of Bedjaoui and others formed much of the legal basis
for the movement towards a New International Economic Order
spearheaded.by DC governments and supported by much postcolonial development work in the 1960s and 1970s. In this way, the postcolonial development theorists, like Critical Race theorists, were generally unwilling
to reject, and indeed often embraced, the transformative potential of law.
III.

THE "LEGITIMATE IDEOLOGY" STRAND

This method goes beyond exposing the inequitable social impact and
internal incoherence of doctrine to demonstrating how both result from,
and are perpetuated by, ideology. In American legal theory, legal realists
pioneered the argument of incoherence in legal rules. Critical Legal
Studies ("CLS") scholarship sought to argue that the "politics" of these
actors derived from socially pervasive "ideology" that tyrannized legal deci56. See generally, Sornorajah, supra note 53.
57. BEDJAOUI, supra note 52, at 100. Many critics, such as Foucalt have commented on the apparent absence of the legal realist notion in legal theory outside
North America. In addition, it is not clear that critical theorists in the United
States outside the law do not share a similar view of the law's relative determinacy.
See David Kennedy, Comments onjamie Boyle's Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U.
COLO. L. REv. 597, 597 (1991) (noting "Jamie Boyle's repeated insistence on the
subjective element in law" and noting Dale Jamieson's idea that obsession with
reality is "infantile").
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sion-makers through a "false" "legal consciousness" 58 that prevented them
from perceiving the indeterminacy of the law they applied. 59 In some of
its incarnations, CLS asserts that these ideological constraints also prevent
the re-imagining of law60 in a way that could better achieve social justice
and individual fulfillment. 61 CLS theorists worked with a melange of continental social theories, some of which had been employed in their origi62
nal milieu at cross-purposes.
Much of CLS eschewed the focus of the external critics of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century on quantifying the role of law in
perpetuating social hierarchy-this was taken as a beginning assumption,
rather than a conclusion. 63 Instead, CLS picked up a thread of inquiry
58. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 220.
59. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1581-82 (1984) (noting that indeterminacy
is often disguised). This is over generalizing many different types of critiques and
to some extent is conflating different types of critique. Also, the question of the
role of determinism and the relationship between the different types of determinism is interesting. Although CLS certainly did not discount, and in fact endorsed,
the Marxian notion of economic determinism, see Kennedy, supra note 38, at 220
(clarifying focus on internal structure of legal reasoning rather than its external
relation to class conflict by venturing that "[t]his is not to say that the latter kind of
motives do not exist-it is their very obviousness that distracts us from the deeper
patterns I want to elucidate. What I am after is the logic of obfuscation, rather
than the struggle of conflicting interests that gives it energy"), they seem to have
two motives for focusing on a more internal critique. These two motives are (1) a
scientific project of quantifying the actual analytical mechanisms through which
these class-determined outcomes were derived, and (2) a belief forged through
their partial alliance to other continental writers such as Freud, Sartre and the
French structuralists that the "superstructure" was much more forcefully and internally self-perpetuating than a pure Marxian critique would suggest. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 38, at 221 ("thinking makes it so").
60. Indeed, even the "dis-imagining." See Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAw AND SOCIOLOGY 25, 46 (RitaJ. Simon & Steven Spitzer
eds., 1980) (calling for "delegitimation of law altogether, which is to say the delegitimation of the notion that social life is created and enforced by imaginary ideas");
see also David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209, 235-37 (1985-86) (noting possible effect of ideologies and false beliefs on people's perceptions and actions).
61. See Gabel, supra note 60, at 46 ("The only antidote to th[e] perpetual
movement of unconscious conspiracy is the development of a concrete disalienating social movement that would make imaginary forms of social cohesion
unnecessary.").
62. Influences on CLS included, for example, G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (1967);JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); CLAUDE

LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1966); Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 26 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL REASON: THEORY OF PRACTICAL ENSEMBLES (1976).
63. See Kennedy, supra note 38, at 220 (stating that the "very obviousness" of
class struggle "distracts us from the deeper patterns I want to elucidate. What I am
after is the logic of obfuscation, rather than the struggle of conflicting interests
that gives it energy."). But see, e.g., Klare, supra note 13 (focusing on external critique). Other CLS scholars, however, did focus on external critique. See, e.g.,
Klare, supra note 13.
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first spun by European social theorists writing during the interwar period,
such as Marcuse, Korsch, Lukacs and Gramsci, who sought to unpack the
ideological and analytical mechanisms through which the law mediated
64
and rationalized outcomes.
The specific means through which this was done varied. Some writers, such as Duncan Kennedy, adapted early French structuralism in order
to argue that legal reasoning operated along relatively fixed, and generally
bipolar, analytical lines. 65 Others, such as Peter Gabel, drew more from
Sartrean existentialism 66 and Freudian repression theory, 67 by focusing on
the reification of specific legal concepts, as opposed to systems of legal
reasoning. These critiques were therefore often doubly determinist in
that they assumed law to be essentially determined by economic relations,
but then also argued that legal outcomes were determined by phenomena
at the level of the mind, whether by psychological structure or philosophical alienation.
What made CLS even more interesting was its desire to retain and
expand the incoherence critique of the legal realists. The synthesis was to
show that legal reasoning operated according to fixed structures; however,
those structures always offered several alternatives to the decision-maker
and were therefore analytically indeterminate and could not be analytically justified. From here, there were two possible critiques. One was to
demonstrate how this structure of reasoning itself perpetuated larger conditions of social inequality. 68 Another was to show how legal decisionmakers, notwithstanding the indeterminacy and the inability tojustify analytically the pursuit of one or another possible line of reasoning within the
64. See Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 26869 (1987) (noting influence of Korsch, Lukacs and Gramsci on CLS); Peter Margulies, Doubting Doubleness, and All That Jazz: Establishment Critiques of Outsider Innovations in Music and Legal Thought, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1997) (noting
Marcuse's pivotal role in shaping CLS).
65. See Kennedy, supra note 60, at 268.
66. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 60, at 31 (noting role that "our shared common
sense of the world as it is" plays in legal reasoning).
67. Specifically, the attempts by the Frankfurt School at integrating Freudian
theory into Marxian theory. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 62; HERBERT MARCUSE,
NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY (1968); HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND
REVOLUTION: HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SocIAL THEORY (1954). These attempts have

been particularly influential. See Gabel, supra note 60, at 42-46 (applying theories
of Freud and Marx); Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36
STAN. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1984) (noting importance of Horkheimer, Habermas
and Marcuse to CLS movement and that they "used Hegelian, Marxist, Freudian,
and Existentialist thought to expose the disguised oppressive elements and contradictions in 'capitalist' society").
68. Thus, in what is generally agreed to be a founding text of CLS, Duncan
Kennedy opened with this quote from Korsch:
[T]he material relations of production of the capitalist epoch only are
what they are in combination with the forms in which they are reflected
in the pre-scientific and bourgeois-scientific consciousness of the period;
and they could not subsist in reality without these forms of consciousness.
K. KORSCH, MARXISM AND PHILOSOPHY 88-89 (F. Halliday trans., 1970).
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structure of legal reasoning, nonetheless did so, with the suggestion that
doing so was therefore driven by a social ideology of liberal legalism. 69
Thus, the attempt by legal decision-makers to construct and administer a "rule of law" is fraught with conflict and inconsistency. The principle
of freedom of contract can often be argued to excuse performance as
much as to require it; the commitment to individual rights can pit rights
against each other; the unfettered "private" social realm is shot through
with government regulation. CLS sought not only to reinforce these observations first made by legal realists, but also to demonstrate how liberal
legal ideology prevented the law's officers and subjects from glimpsing
them. This argument was then interwoven with external criticism, which
sought to show how the law, particularly law in liberal society, perpetuated
conditions of social inequality. Taken together, the critique was that liberal legal ideology prevented the law's officers and subjects from perceiving its deep internal flaws, and the result was the perpetuation of social
70
inequality through legitimating the status quo.
CRT incorporated this ideological critique by focusing it on the question of racial hierarchy. Critical Race theorists sought to show how liberal
ideology served to "mystify" internal contradictions in the law and, therefore, also rationalized the perpetuation of racial hierarchy that resulted
from the application of the law. Thus, in her critique of antidiscrimination law, Kimberl( Crenshaw adopts Antonio Gramsci's definition of hegemony as consisting both of "consent" of the "great masses of the
population" and of "coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on
7
1 Using this model, Crenshaw argues
those groups who do not 'consent.' ,,
69. Social ideology need not always support the status quo; it may also come
to undermine it. See Kennedy, supra note 37, at 528 (noting scenario when decision-makers attempt to create "legal arguments that go against [the] first impression of what the law is"). Under either scenario, decision-makers can take
advantage of legal indeterminacy to formulate opinions that nonetheless seem logically determined by virtue of their replication of certain well-established analytical
structures. See id. Erich Fromm's "humanist" version of Marx was popularized in
the "New Left" movement on American university campuses in the 1960s which
may also have influenced CLS. See DAVID McCLELUN, MARXMsm AFTER MARx 319
(1979) ("In as far as Marxism was influential in the early New Left it was in the
form of the concept of alienation drawn from young Marx as interpreted by Erich
Fromm.").
70. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369-70 n.1
(1982-83).
Hierarchical social relations are fashioned and reproduced principally
through cultural conditioning rather than through the direct use of
force. One element of this conditioning process is the creation of legal
concepts and doctrines to establish the political legitimacy of the existing
order. Judicial opinions play an important part in this process of legitimation ....
Id.
71. Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1360.
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that the coercion of black Americans is made possible by virtue of the con72
sent of whites to "the dominant ideology."
In postcolonialdevelopment theory.73

Much as American critical legal the-

orists took on the conception of the formalist conception of law, the
scholar and jurist Mohamed Bedjaoui took to task a fetishism of "law for
law's sake." 74 He argued that the dominant view of international law,
which was resistant to its reform to accommodate the critiques of
postcolonial development theorists and the attempted reforms by DC governments, rested on an ideological attachment to liberal legalism. Liberal
ideology about the rule of law required a certain set of rules that were
supposed to be natural, inevitable and, therefore, immutable, and failed to
recognize that tools existed within the law to redirect it in a way more
accommodating to the demands for reform. This view of law therefore
became a kind of "paganism" of "false idolatry"-a concept seemingly
quite similar to the notion of "reification" and ideological apologia estab75
lished in CLS and developed in CRT.
IV. THE "ILLEGITIMATE IDEOLOGY" STRAND
The examination of law for its role in mediating and reinforcing the
illegitimate and illiberal ideology of racism was the contribution of CRT to
the pantheon of critical legal theories developed throughout the twentieth
century. 76 This illegitimate-ideological method exposes not only the structurally unjust impact of the law, the indeterminacy of the rules that create
that impact, and the obfuscation of the impact and the indeterminacy of
the rules by a liberal ideology-it also argues that the obfuscation is aided
in some important cases by illiberal bias. 77 Thus, CRT endorsed the CLS
liberal-ideological critique with its combination of excavation of ideology,
internal deconstruction and criticism of hierarchy, but extended it in a
72. Id. at 1358-59. Thus, Crenshaw writes, "White race consciousness ... acts
to further Black subordination by justifying all the forms of unofficial racial discrimination .... Id. at 1379-80 (asserting that racism also acts to rationalize continued racial inequality within a formally legal regime: "After all, equal opportunity
is the rule, . . . if Blacks are on the bottom, it must reflect their relative
inferiority.").
73. For a discussion of criticism of international law generally, see supra note
37 and accompanying text.
74. BEDJAOUI, supra note 52, at 98.

75. See id. at 100.
76. See supra note 13 for a discussion of CLS and racial critique.
77. See, e.g.,
Girardeau Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990) (arguing that constitutional interpretation by the United States Supreme Court incorporates bias against racial minorities, and observing that "Supreme Court justices
are themselves majoritarian, in the sense that they have been socialized by the
dominant culture. As a result, they have internalized the basic values and assumptions of that culture; including the beliefs and predispositions that can cause the
majority to discount minority interests."), reprinted in CUTrING EDGE, supra note 4,
at 23.
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few ways designed to take into account specifically the problem of racial
78
injustice.
Part of the illegitimate-ideological critique was the demonstration of
how definitions of legal terms themselves inscribed otherness and coercion. 79 So, whereas the CLS author Peter Gabel criticized legal terms as
reifications of liberal ideology, 80 many Critical Race theorists critiqued legal terms as reifications of illiberal ideology. In Whiteness as Property,
Cheryl Harris argued that the privileges accorded by whiteness were defined and mediated by law, and that "ideologically, they became part of
the settled expectations of whites."8 1 Neil Gotanda provided a detailed
explanation of how legal decision-makers have constructed an ideology of
82
race and race classification that legitimates racial subordination.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw argued that white supremacy is the ideology that produces consent by whites to the dominant regime and mediates and legiti83
mates the subordination of blacks.
78. The CRT critique of CLS has been well absorbed by now. For a look at
early critiques that fueled the establishment of the first CRT conference, see the
1987 issue of the HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW devoted to
"Minority Critiques of the CLS Movement," in which several prominent writers in
this vein contemplated "the promise and the frustration which CLS holds for minority scholarship and politics." Jose A. Bracamonte, Foreword: Minority Critiques of
the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297 (1987). See
generally Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435
(1987); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987).
Besides the failure to deal with race, another important source of "minority
critique" was the perception that CLS "trashing" of existing law delegitimated the
use of existing law-most importantly civil rights-by advocates and activists to

obtain racial justice. See supra notes 45-48. This also is parallel to the attempt to
reform existing constructs in international law-such as sovereignty-in order to
obtain economic justice, carried out under the banner of the NIEO. See supra
notes 50-57.
79. See, e.g., Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 174950 (1993) (noting that United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson "did not
specifically consider any particular rule of race definition, but it protected the
property interest in whiteness for all whites by subsuming even those like Plessy...
within categories that were predicated on white supremacy and race subordination"); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, TranslatingYonnondio by Precedent andEvidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuE L.J. 625, 633-35 (1990) (describing how
legal definition of "Tribe" did violence and injustice to Mashpee).
80. See generally Gabel, supra note 59.
81. Harris, supra note 79, at 1749-50.
82. Neil Gotanda, Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1991).
83. For Crenshaw, the exposure of illiberal ideology follows from Gramsci.
Crenshaw applies Gramsci to American race relations to suggest that whites consent to a racist legal regime while blacks are coerced by it. See Crenshaw, supra
note 42, at 1359-60 (noting that Gramsci recognized coercion and consensus as
"the two fundamental types of political control" and stating that "coercion of
Blacks may provide a basis for others to consent to the dominant order").
This method seems to come at least partially from an absorption of critical
theory emerging out of literary and critical studies. See, e.g.,
Hugh Baxter, Bringing
Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 449, 478 (1996) (book
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In postcolonial development theory. Although the illegitimate-ideological
critique has been thoroughly employed in aspects of postcolonial theory
such as cultural and literary studies, it is only beginning to receive an application in international law. This leads to my third conclusion resulting
from this comparative analysis: at the same time that Critical Race theorists
have done more to expose the ideology behind law than to expose the
material impact of law, postcolonial development theorists have focused
on the material impact of law at the expense of addressing its ideological
content. CRT, which originated explicitly to address the perpetuation of
racial subordination in the United States after the end of formal segregation, expressly focuses on ways in which legitimate ideology (liberalism)
interacts with illegitimate ideology (white supremacy) to rationalize and
suppress the visible failure of the legal regime to assure racial minorities
access to social equality. Applied to the postcolonial framework, this analysis helps to draw attention to the ways in which colonial discourse interacts with and supports prevailing legal ideology in the international order
by attributing the persistent economic inequality of Southern countries to
inferior characteristics of "otherness," and therefore rationalizes the continuing domination of the North by the South as a product of Northern
superiority. 84 This section of the Essay seeks to describe the analysis as
developed elsewhere in postcolonial theory and then to sketch a preliminary application to international law.
Much of postcolonial theory has concerned itself with showing how
Western culture has produced and perpetuates an ideological conception
review) ("Seen in this way, Foucault's work suggests connections between legal
scholarship and 'cultural studies' approaches."); Matsuda, supra note 4, at 325 &
n.10 (discussing Gramsci's model and Cornel West's discussion of model).
In subsequent years, Asian-Cit and Lat-Crit writers have broadened the scope
of CRT. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & Robert S. Chang, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/
National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1997); Sumi Cho, Redeeming
Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REv. 73 (1998); Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit
Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997); Leti Volpp,
Blaming Culturefor Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 89 (2000).
84. See, e.g., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1989, at 6-15 (1989); Michael Driscoll, The Developing-Country Debt Crisis: Comments on the Role of 'Northern'
Macroeconomic Policy Coordination, in THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGIME 329
(Graham Bird ed., 1990). A related conclusion would be that liberal ideology suppressed the apparent inability of liberal legal regime to correct Southern underdevelopment by attributing it to the failures of Southern governments to
comply fully with liberal international legal rules relating to foreign trade, investment and finance. Thus, severe debt crises experienced by many Latin American
and Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1980s were partially attributed to
statist and "discriminatory" economic policies and practices of the debtor governments, rather than to either continuing Northern economic dominance or liberal,
international economic law. These arguably resulted in the concentration of DC
export production in volatile and recession-prone commodities; chronically low
savings and investment rates resulting from perpetual capital flight and the repatriation of profits by foreign-owned corporations; undisciplined and ill-supervised
lending practices of international financial institutions; and so forth.
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of the "South" as an amalgam of inferior characteristics, which serve to
rationalize domination of the South and the South's continuing position
of inequality. Emerging somewhat later 85 than the work summarized
under the other methodological strands, a wave of post-structuralists, beginning with Edward Said, 86 generated an analysis of the ideological components of Northern hegemony by tracing the development of the
discursive categories of the "colonizer" and the "colonized" or "other." If
"colonialism" is defined as the combined will to geographical, cultural,
racial and economic hegemony of the North over the South, a sketch of
the categories that colonial discourse deploys to legitimate Northern he87
gemony might juxtapose the following:

85. But antecedents were in the same continental theorists that inspired CLS,
and also in important Third World authors like Franz Fanon, Aime Cesaire and
Leopold Senghor.
86. "It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Edward Said's Orentalism...
single-handedly inaugurate[d] a new area of academic inquiry: . . .colonial discourse theory .... " COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY- A READER

(Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994).
87. See generally MALEK ALLOULA, THE COLONIAL HAREM (Myrna & Wlad
Godzich trans., 1986); ETIENNE BALiBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION,
CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES (1991); RENATO CONSTANTINO, NEOCOLONIAL IDENTITY AND COUNTER-CoNscIOUSNESS: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL DECOLONIZATION (1978);
EUROPE AND ITS OTHERS (Francis Barker et al. eds., 1985); ABDUL R. JANMOHAMED,
MANICHEAN AESTHETICS: THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1983);
ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1965); SARA MILLS, DISCOURSES OF DIFFERENCE (1991); "RACE," CULTURE AND DIFFERENCE (James Donald

& Ali

Rattansi eds., 1992); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993)
[hereinafter SAID, CULTURE]; EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) [hereinafter

SAID, ORIENTALISM]; EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS

AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986);
Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Culture Economy, 2 PUBLIC
CULTURE
CRITICISM

1 (1990); Anthony Appiah, Out of Africa: Topologies of Nativism, 1 YALEJ.
153 (1988); Homi Bhabha, Representation and the Colonial Text: A Critical

Exploration of Some Forms of Mimeticism, in

THE THEORY OF READING

93 (Frank

Gloversmith ed., 1984); Homi Bhabha, The Other Question-The Stereotype and Colonial Discourse, 24 SCREEN 18 (1983); Laura Chrisman, The Imperial Unconscious? Representations of Imperial Discourse,32 CRITICAL Q. 38 (1990);Johannes Fabian, Presence
and Representation: The Other and Anthropological Writing, 16 CRITICAL INQUIRY 753
(1990); Abdul R. JanMohamed, The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of
Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 59 (1985); Geeta
Kapur, The Centre-PeripheryModel: Or, How Are We Placed? Contemporary CulturalPractice in India, 16/17 THIRD TEXT 9 (1991); Edward W. Said, Representingthe Colonized:
Anthropology's Interlocutors, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 205 (1989) [hereinafter Said, Anthropology's Interlocutors];Robert Stam & Louise Spence, Colonialism,Racism and Representation,24 SCREEN 2 (1983).
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North

South

Geographical

here/center

there/periphery

Cultural

civilized
modem
scientific
rational

barbaric
traditional
mystical
irrational

industrious/ambitious

lazy/dishonest

"rule of law"

1217

lawless

Racial

white

non-white

Economic

capitalist
efficient
growing

pre-capitalist
inefficient
stagnating

These categories have operated, for example, in social-scientific work relating to culture and development. Early on, for example, Max Weber
developed a famous series of typologies allocating, among others, the
characteristics of "formality" and "rationality" to Western culture and the
characteristics of "informality" and "irrationality" to non-Western culture. 8 8 These inherent differences, Weber argued, explained the rise of
capitalism in the West and its absence elsewhere. After decolonization,
these discursive categories were embraced by Northern academics and
professionals who designed the international order's stance specifically towards developing countries. As bureaucrats in, or consultants to, international organizations and Northern (and Southern) governments, these
individuals straightforwardly viewed Third World "culture" as an obstacle
to economic development. Bert Hoselitz, founder of the journal Economic
Development and Cultural Change, raised the question whether economic de-

velopment required "only a change in certain aspects of overt behavior
[such as] the acquisition of new skills or the exercise of new forms of productive activity," or whether it also had to be "accompanied by or contingent upon more basic changes in ...the structure of values and beliefs in
a culture." 89 Works such as The Achievement Motive (1953) and The Achievement Society (1961) by David McClelland, 9 0 and The Civic Culture, Political
Culture and Political Development by Talcott Parsons, reproduced and ex88. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Scribner & Sons eds., Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (describing cultures); see also
REINHARD BENDIX & GUENTHER ROTH, SCHOLARSHIP AND PARTISANSHIP: ESSAYS ON
MAX WEBER (1971); ANTHONY GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE WRITINGS OF MARX, DURKHEIM AND MAX WEBER

(1971).

89. Irene Gendzier, Culture and Development: Veiled Apologetic, or An Effort at
Social Reconstruction of Economic and PoliticalChange?, 13 FLETHCHER F. WORLD AFF.

217, 221 (1989).
90. See generally DAVID

MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE

inafter MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE]
DAVID MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY

(1961)

(1953) [here-

(extending Weber's theses);
(same).
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tended Weber's theses and significantly influenced both academic work
and bureaucratic policy on development. 9 1
The critique of these accounts is not, of course, the mere use of, or
interest in, the analysis of culture as a causal factor in the development of
economies or societies. Rather, the critique is two-fold. First, the discourse that developed around culture and development derived from
Northern representations of Southern culture. The central position of the
Northern speaker perpetuates hegemony both by implying the inability of
the South to represent itself9 2 and by reconstituting the South into a
clutch of inferior traits defined in opposition to the North. Second, culture, as deployed in this discourse, deflects attention from other factors
that might provide at least an equally compelling explanation of underdevelopment, including inadequacies in the prevailing economic regime. According to the culture and development narrative, obstacles to
development lay not in Northern economic dominance or in the international regime, but rather in the cultural incapacity of the South to partake
fully in the benefits of liberal economy. The critique of the culture and
development discourse, in other words, is not that it addresses culture,
but, rather, that its treatment of culture operates to preserve both ideological and material sources of Northern hegemony.
Applied to international law, this critical framework demonstrates

that the international "order" perpetuates Northern hegemony not only
by virtue of its explicit rules and ideology, but also by virtue of a submerged "colonialist" ideology that rationalizes the contradictions between

the implied outcomes of a liberalized international economy and the economic realities facing developing countries. Relatively early on, Mohamed
Bedjaoui made some movement towards arguing that legal objections to
the NIEO attempts to reform international economic law were grounded
in an ideology of Northern domination. Bedjaoui wrote of the "philosophical and methodological absurdity" of the argument that proposals
for reform were anti-law: "Such an attitude is merely a manifestation of
93
legal imperialism, a logical component of imperialism pure and simple."
This thesis has recently been expanded in important ways. Antony
Anghie has done groundbreaking work in demonstrating "the formative
influence of colonialism on international law" and how "[i]ssues of racial
superiority, cultural subordination, and economic exploitation played an
extraordinarily prominent role in shaping the relationship between inter-

91. See generally MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE, supra note 90 (extending Weber's theses).
92. Recall Karl Marx's admonition, "They cannot represent themselves; they
must be represented." Said, Anthropology's Interlocutors, supra note 87, at 21 (quoting KARL MARx,THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPART 124 (International
Public, 1964) (1852)).
93. BEDJAOUI, supra note 52, at 101.
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national law and colonialism." 9 4 Anghie has shown, for example, how the
concept of sovereignty "was not simply a European idea extended to peripheral areas [but] developed out of the colonial encounter," and mediated aspects of international law such as the trusteeship system.9 5 Vasuki
Nesiah has described how conceptions of territory in contemporary international law "structure our collective gaze in the retroactive reconstruction of territorial relationships at the moment of colonization, in ways that
then frame the terrain of options made available in decolonization." 9 6
James Gathii has elaborated the racial and cultural biases operative in prevailing conceptions of aspects of the international economic order, such as
the "good governance" policies of the international financial institutions. 9 7 Elizabeth Iglesias has articulated a "Lat Crit" framework for linking racial injustice across national boundaries. 98 Nathaniel Berman has
elucidated the "genealogist's" critical view of international law as "shifting
fortification for patriarchal power." 99 Gil Gott has argued for viewing Japanese-American internment as an instance through an international law
lens.10 0 Balakrishnan Rajagopal has described the "cultural geography" of
the "Third World." 10 1 These and other authors 10 2 are now mining the
rich field of international law for evidence of biased discursive structures.
94. Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutionsand the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 243, 245 (2000);
see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 34 (1999) (demonstrating influ-

ence of colonialism on international law).
95. Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home": Colonialism,EnvironmentalDamage
and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 448 (1993).
96. Vasuki Nesiah, TerritorialSovereignty in ICJJurisprudence,92 AM. Soc'y INT'L
L. PROC. 376, 376 (1998).
97. SeeJames Thuo Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good GovernanceDiscourse:

Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 1998-99
STUD. 65.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL

98. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, InstitutionalizingEconomicJustice: A Latcrit Perspective on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of 'Community' to the Transformation
of Legal Structures That Institutionalize the Depoliticization and Fragmentationof Labor!
Community Solidarity, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.L. 773 (2000) (stating framework for
linking racial injustice against Latina/os across national boundaries).
99. Nathaniel Berman, The Grotius Lecture Series, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1515,
1523 (1999).
100. See Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents:Japanese American Internment As Foreign Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REv. 179, 229 (1998).
101. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography,

1998-1999

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.

102. For further reading in the area of international law and biased discursive
structures, see Aoki, supra note *; Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights
and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing

Countries?, 41 HARv. INT'L LJ. 381 (2000); Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating
Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 201 (1999); and
Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under
the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARv. INT'L LJ. 419 (2000).
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CONCLUSION

This Essay has discussed four methods of critique: external critique,
which exposes the impact of law on material social conditions; internal
critique, which exposes inconsistency and incoherence in legal reasoning
and decision-making; legitimate-ideological, critique, which exposes the
role law plays in creating and maintaining liberal ideology; and illegitimate-ideological critique, which exposes the role law plays in creating and
maintaining illiberal social ideologies such as racism and colonialism.
This Essay investigated the ways in which each of these four methods
has been deployed by CRT and postcolonial development theory. A comparison of each theory's use of the four methods reveals striking parallels:
in particular, both CRT and postcolonial development theory sought to
expose the incoherence of the law at the same time that they expressed
faith in its transformative potential. However, such a comparison also suggests ways in which each theory might benefit by incorporating lessons
from the other: CRT might benefit by expanding its critique of law's material impact; postcolonial development theory might benefit through
more attention to the ideological dimensions of law. In all of their methodological variety, these theories have contributed importantly to the investigation of law's relationship to justice-and injustice.
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